TRUTH AS RATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE

Abstract

It is considered epistemological difficulties of the truth correspondent concept, solution of which determines the qualitative transformation of the scientific cognition goal. It has been carried out the analysis of the correspondence concept, which indicates that it does not have the necessary theoretical resources of justification as a criterion of truth. This circumstance refutes the view of the uniqueness and universality of the truth correspondent concept. It is not refuted, but its epistemological status is significantly altered. Truth corresponding conception appears to be as one of the possible epistemological hypotheses along with others. A new look at the correspondent theory of truth opens new prospects for scientific rationality, corrects its cognitive resource. The rational acceptability concept of knowledge comes to replace the truth knowledge as a correspondence of knowledge to the reality. It is emphasized that the given “truth” concept evolution is not a result of alternative points of view criticism, but is a consequence of self-correcting scientific practice, and its new philosophical concept is based on the achievements of non-classical science. This thesis is confirmed by the scientific standards that scientific community is guided by. For the first time this question was investigated by K. Popper in the philosophy of science. In the result of his research, he formulated two methodological positions that are explicitly or implicitly presented in science: the concepts of phallibilism and falsificationism. The article points out that Popper’s pioneering ideas have developed in modern American analytical philosophy. This conclusion is supported by the views review of H. Patnem. Summing up, it is given a positive assessment of these changes in the theory of knowledge. The truth concept as rational acceptability overcomes a number of epistemological difficulties, which appear to be in disparity of goals and results of scientific activity.