Introduction. After their triumphant rise to power in October 1917, the most important task for the Bolsheviks was to build a new, socialist society, to “create a new world and a new human being” [1, p. 8]. Confidence in the imminent fulfillment of this task helped the supporters of the “Red Camp” to hold their ground and prevail in the fierce battles of the Civil War. This commitment to a socialist future was never in doubt, even during the NEP period, which for the Communist Party was a time of forced compromises and concessions to capitalist forces. And at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s, I.V. Stalin and his supporters attempted once again, and this time successfully, to bring their vision of socialism to life by launching sweeping reforms, traditionally referred to as Soviet (Stalinist) modernization.

According to a widespread and, it seems, well-founded view, these transformations represented not merely another stage in the “catch-up” modernization characteristic of our country, but an attempt at social engineering, a “unique example of large-scale, purposeful construction of a new society” [2, p. 18]. For this reason, the results of the modernization carried out in the USSR in the 1930s were not limited to a powerful industrial sector, a developed agricultural sector, and a broad network of numerous scientific, educational, cultural, and medical institutions, but were much more extensive and profound. In the course of modernization, the foundations of the USSR’s socioeconomic structure were laid, which remained virtually unchanged for half a century. Another result of the social engineering practiced by the Communist Party in the 1920s and 1930s was the emergence in the USSR of a new generation: the “new Soviet man” [3, p. 180].

Since the “new people” in the USSR of the 1920s–1930s were not a side effect of modernization but the inevitable result of deliberate social engineering, this phenomenon has been analyzed repeatedly in both domestic and foreign scholarly literature. Soviet researchers interpreted a contemporary participant in the “great construction projects of socialism” of the 1920s–1930s in two ways. They were rightly characterized as a builder of socialism who “transformed the surrounding world and, at the same time, changed himself” [4, p. 408], undergoing a process of psychological rebirth, ridding themselves of the dominant traits and vestiges of capitalist psychology and acquiring the characteristics of consciousness inherent in socialist society. One striking example of such transformations was the peasantry, which, under the influence of collectivization, was transformed, according to statements by I.V. Stalin, from the “petty bourgeoisie” into one of the two classes of socialist society [5, pp. 8–9].

In general, Soviet authors focused on the principles and methods of shaping “new people” in the USSR and identifying their sociopsychological characteristics, which made it possible to speak of the citizens of the Soviet Union as a qualitatively new, previously nonexistent community. The “new Soviet man” was portrayed as a bearer of socialist ideas, an enterprising, free individual, and an internationalist who advocated for friendship among peoples and opposed all forms of oppression [6, 7, 8].

In contrast to Soviet approaches, foreign literature presented entirely different interpretations of the “new man” that had emerged in the USSR as absolute truths. He was portrayed as a mere cog in the ruthless totalitarian machine, deprived of freedom and completely dependent on the state. This perception was characteristic not only of Western scholars [1, 9, 10], but even more so of Soviet dissidents who had emigrated (or been exiled) abroad [11, 12]. The widespread use in foreign literature of the term “Homo Soveticus” used “in a derogatory and contemptuous… sense” [12, p. 31] became the quintessence of this negative approach to understanding the essence of the Soviet man.

During the era of “perestroika” and in the 1990s and early 2000s, Russian scholars generally uncritically echoed narratives claiming that Homo Soveticus was “a rather vile creature” [12, p. 31]. One of the most telling examples of such uncritical repetition is the work of Y.A. Levada, who, in particular, portrayed the Soviet person as a being isolated from the outside world by the “Iron Curtain,” subject to tight state control, oblivious to their historical roots, insecure, and aggressive [13, 14]. At that time, an in-depth analysis of the methods used in the USSR to shape the “new man” and his essential characteristics was replaced by a sweeping denigration of the Soviet era, which went so far as to demonize it.

Throughout the 2000s, negative interpretations of the Soviet project have been subject to well-founded criticism. For example, O.V. Milaeva rightly points out that the generalized image of the “Soviet man” as “soulless, intimidated by the system, corrupt, and prone to informing on others, full of fear, and devoid of intellectual initiative…” stands in clear contradiction to the diversity of historical reality [15, p. 249]. By challenging the aforementioned negative stereotypes, scholars have focused their efforts on a deep and comprehensive analysis of the process of the formation of Soviet society in all its contradictions. A number of studies have analyzed the methods of social engineering and the upbringing of younger generations used in the USSR, the dynamics of state approaches to the formation of the “new Soviet man,” the effectiveness of these efforts, the characteristics of the cultural code of Soviet society, the dominant features of public consciousness, and so on [15, 16, 17].

Despite the findings of many years of scholarly research, the issue of the formation of Soviet society and the emergence of the “new man” in the USSR during the 1920s and 1930s is so vast and complex that it requires further in-depth study. A comprehensive analysis of these processes will allow for a better understanding of their mechanisms and enable us to completely reject both blanket negativity (as well as uncritical glorification) regarding the methods and results of Soviet social engineering. Understanding the techniques used to create “new people” in the USSR is also significant from a practical standpoint. In particular, the vast experience accumulated during the Soviet period in the patriotic (including military-patriotic) education of younger generations is highly relevant today, when one of the most important conditions for Russia’s stable development is social unity and the establishment of active state-led educational efforts among young people.

Based on the foregoing, in this publication we have attempted to analyze the methods used to shape the “new people” in the Soviet Union throughout the 1930s. Thus, the subject of this study is the techniques of social engineering in the USSR. The subject of the study is the Soviet press of the 1930s as a powerful instrument of agitation and propaganda, which, among other things, was widely used by the ruling Communist Party of the USSR to shape the “new man”.

Materials and Methods. This study is based on materials from the Azov-Black Sea Region, which existed from 1934 to 1937 and encompassed, within its administrative boundaries, the vast territories of the Don, Kuban, and Adygea. The use of regional materials from southern Russia allows us to refine our understanding of the technologies employed in the USSR in the 1930s to create the “new man” by identifying local characteristics that, at times, took on such significance that they became the basis for distinct variants (directions) of social engineering. In this context, it is important to note the presence within the Azov-Black Sea Region of large communities of Don and Kuban Cossacks, who in the 1920s–1930s retained, albeit in a greatly diminished form, their sociocultural distinctiveness and constituted a significant portion of the region’s labor force. Although the Bolsheviks had viewed the Cossacks with suspicion since the Civil War, they could not ignore the Cossacks’ significant military and economic potential and sought to harness it for the benefit of the Soviet state. To this end, a campaign “for the Soviet Cossacks” was launched in the USSR in 1936, which, as will be shown below, was carried out using social engineering techniques.

In addition to published documents, testimonies, and memoirs of contemporaries, as well as materials from speeches by party officials, periodicals from the 1930s form the core of the source base for this study. During the period under consideration, the press was not only the most widespread medium of mass communication but also a powerful instrument of “ideological influence” [18, p. 4] on the public consciousness. Periodicals played an important role in agitation, propaganda, the shaping of public opinion, and the education of the younger generations in the USSR. At the same time, the press served as an effective means for the creation of the “new man.” Newspapers and magazines promoted a “socialist attitude toward labor” (in particular, they extolled the achievements of udarniks (shock workers) and Stakhanovites) and featured photographs of famous Soviet figures who served as models of the “new man” and whom ordinary citizens were expected to emulate.

We analyzed publications and articles from central and regional periodicals of the 1930s. First and foremost, we would like to highlight the magazines “USSR in Construction” and “Nashi Dostizhenia” (Our Achievements), which were among the most well-known and reputable Soviet publications of the 1930s, dedicated to covering the successes of socialist construction and the creation of a new society in the Soviet Union. This is particularly true of “USSR in Construction”, a magnificently illustrated magazine containing a vast number of photographs that exerted a tremendous influence not only on Soviet audiences but also on those abroad. Among the regional press, we should note the magazines “Kolkhozny Put” (Collective-farm path) and “Kolkhoznitsa” (Collective-farm woman), which were the official publications of the Azov-Black Sea Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and the newspaper “Molot” (Hammer), which also belonged to the regional press. All of these publications contain a wealth of information on the processes of shaping the “new man” in the USSR.

From a theoretical and methodological standpoint, this study is grounded in the principles of the project approach, which is based on the ideas of social design. From the perspective of this approach, Soviet society is viewed as “the result of purposeful human activity, driven by the socialist ideal, mythologically refracted in their consciousness” [2, p. 16]. Accordingly, the process of forming the “new man” in the USSR appears to have been consciously initiated, implemented, and controlled by Communist Party ideologues, including through the press. The primary research methods are comparative-historical and historical-genetic. These methods make it possible to identify both the fundamental, unchanging principles and postulates of the social engineering practiced by the Bolsheviks and the dynamics of the approaches and methods used to influence public consciousness and create the “new man,” which were applied in the USSR (including in the southern regions of Russia) in the 1920s and 1930s.

Results. Experts rightly point out that the Bolshevik leadership’s approaches to shaping the “new man” underwent significant changes throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In the first decade after the October Revolution, the “new man” was conceived by Bolshevik ideologists as “the man of liberated labor as a new historical figure” [19, p. 8]. Moreover, during that period, this subject was depersonalized and perceived as a kind of atom, a particle of the collective devoid of individuality; collectivism unquestionably dominated individualism.

The “new man” of the 1920s was portrayed not only as a liberated worker but also as a selfless fighter for a “bright future.” Particularly telling are the statements by one of the oldest Bolsheviks, the “conscience of the party,” A.A. Solts, who asserted that “we must mold ourselves into fighters” capable of “crushing the capitalist world” [3, p. 195]. In this regard, the press and literature of those years constantly used epithets such as “stone,” “iron,” and “steel” to describe these future “new people” [20, pp. 365–366].

In the 1930s, approaches to shaping the “new man” changed significantly: faceless mass conformity gave way to individuality. The “new people” of the 1930s were conceived as individuals endowed with strong willpower, capable of heroism in labor and battle, of overcoming difficulties, and of self-sacrifice. One manifestation of this trend was the emergence of the cult of personality surrounding I.V. Stalin, which created “a dramatic contrast with the previous veneration of anonymous masses, classes, and the party” [10, p. 138]. At the same time, there was a shift away from the “iron,” unfeeling hero, which was how the “new man” of the 1920s was conceived. In the 1930s, heroes became more animated; they were “humanized” and “warmed up” [20, p. 365].

Nevertheless, alongside the aforementioned transformations, the technology for constructing the “new man” in the 1930s retained a strong continuity with the preceding phase. The “new man” (“hero”) of the 1930s, although endowed with individuality, was not set in opposition to the collective and, moreover, had “meaning only within a certain community” [20, p. 378], whether that community was social (workers, collective farmers) or professional: tractor drivers, miners, pilots, and so on. As before, the person of the 1930s was expected to be a fighter, striving toward a socialist future and ready to endure material hardships and everyday inconveniences for the sake of this great goal. Yu.A. Zhukov, in his book “People of the 1930s”, correctly observed that “although their lives were very difficult, they did not complain; they worked passionately and selflessly, displaying a kind of Spartan renunciation of worldly gain…” [21, p. 112]. The “renewed ‘new man’” as a strong, purpose-driven individual, freed from exploitation and embodying the most advanced social system was expected to successfully accomplish the grand tasks set before the USSR: industrialization, collectivization, and the “cultural revolution,” tasks that could not be accomplished by the people of the capitalist West, who embodied backward bourgeois values [3, pp. 201–202].

The Soviet press of the 1930s actively promoted the images of heroes from the first Five-Year Plans, publishing their photographs, biographies, and calls for their compatriots to follow their example. After all, these heroes were viewed as the ideal model of the “new man”, emerging in the USSR alongside socialism. Their images personified the social and technical progress with which the Soviet regime was associated, and which reinforced the regime’s appeal and legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

For example, in the eighth issue of the magazine “The USSR Under Construction” from 1935, dedicated to the construction of the Moscow Metro, there are photographs of young metro construction workers who received government awards for labor valor: Vazyha Zamaldinova, awarded the Order of the Red Star, and Kraevsky and Yaremchuk, awarded the Order of Lenin [22, pp. 19, 21]. After the Stakhanovite movement gained momentum, photographs of A.G. Stakhanov himself and his followers were widely published in the press. In particular, the magazine “Nashi Dostizhenia” highlighted the record set by the founder of the Stakhanov movement by publishing his portrait in its first issue of 1936, as well as a joint photograph of Stakhanov and M.D. Dyukanov, who had set a new coal production record [23, pp. 6, 22].

Moreover, the reevaluation of approaches to shaping the image of the “new man” that took place at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s made it significantly easier for the press to carry out its propaganda tasks. It was much easier to glorify a specific individual than an amorphous “mass,” especially if he (or she) was photogenic. The inspirational impact of a particular hero on the audience was also much stronger, since such a hero was a living person rather than an abstract symbol. Often, this impact was targeted, since, as already noted, despite their individuality, these heroes represented their respective social and professional groups: Stakhanov and Dyukanov served as role models for miners, Maria Demchenko for beet growers, Makar Mazai for steelworkers, and so on. Their outstanding achievements were intended to inspire other citizens of the USSR to similar feats of labor.

We might add that an analysis of the Soviet press suggests the existence of a certain hierarchy of “heroes,” at the top of which stood Stalin. He, of course, possessed a status incomparably higher than that of a mere hero. Stalin was portrayed as a “leader,” a wise “teacher,” and a mentor to the “heroes.” Below them were lesser Bolshevik “leaders,” ranked among Stalin’s closest associates: L.M. Kaganovich, V.M. Molotov, and others. Further down were Party and Soviet officials at the republican and regional levels, while the base of this hierarchical pyramid was made up of ordinary “heroes,” who were given the grand title of “Soviet nobility” (“noble people”).

A fine example of this kind of hierarchy can be found in the first issue of “The USSR Under Construction” from 1934. The issue was devoted to the commissioning of the Bobrikovo Energy-Chemical Complex in the Moscow Region and opened with a huge, full-page photograph of Stalin and Kaganovich. On the following pages (pages three through eight) were captions that formed a single sentence: “The Party… economic managers… specialists… shock workers… are building… Bobriki… using coal from the Moscow region.” Below the captions were photographs depicting, respectively, Party officials and economic managers (K.V. Ryndin, Chairman of the Moscow City Executive Committee G.N. Kaminsky, Deputy People’s Commissar for Heavy Industry G.L. Pyatakov, and others), who were “firmly in the Bolshevik spirit” leading “the construction to a successful conclusion,” as well as specialists and shock workers involved in the construction [24, pp. 2–8].

Discussion and Conclusion. The press in the Azov-Black Sea region adhered to established norms, promoting and glorifying the “notable figures” of the Don and Kuban regions. Considerable attention was paid both to Stalin and other members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and to the “leaders” of the Azov-Black Sea region, who embodied Soviet power there. The pages of local publications featured speeches by regional-level Party and Soviet officials, along with their photographs. As was customary at the time, government officials were depicted in deliberately democratic attire: frock coats (a fashion trend set by Stalin), jackets, undershirts, kosovorotka shirts, and caps. For example, B.P. Sheboldayev, First Secretary of the Azov-Black Sea Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, wore a jacket and a kosovorotka shirt, and in appearance with his hairstyle and mustache resembled Stalin [25, p. 3; 26, p. 1]. This resemblance was likely no coincidence, since other party functionaries who emulated the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) also adopted these same physical traits. As R.A. Medvedev notes, Kaganovich himself wore a goatee in 1930, but soon kept only a mustache, following Stalin’s example [27, pp. 99–100].

When biographies of Bolshevik “leaders” were published in the press, the focus was on their “proper” social background, their origins among the common people, and their contributions to the struggle for Soviet power. In 1937, when introducing their readers to E.G. Evdokimov, a new First Secretary of the Azov-Black Sea Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who had replaced Sheboldayev in this position. Journalists claimed that he came from a family of railroad workers [28, p. 3] (according to other sources, the region’s new leader was the son of a poor peasant and was born “while his father was serving in the army and his mother worked as a cook and laundress” [29, p. 4]). It was noted that he had already taken part in the revolutionary struggle as a teenager, and during the Civil War he became an employee of the Cheka (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission) [29, p. 4].

A similar approach was taken when the press published articles about various “notable figures” from the Azov-Black Sea region who had become famous for their achievements in labor. Often, they were photographed in the everyday clothes they wore at home and at work. For example, the magazine “Kolkhoznitsa” contains numerous photographs of women, members of collective farms in the Azov-Black Sea region, who achieved high results in their productive and social activities. Typically, they are pictured wearing headscarves, kerchiefs, blouses, and jackets, as well as skirts, the very same outfits they wore while working in the collective farm fields. Such were the outfits worn by Yagunova, Dukanova, Zemlyakova, and others, members of the “May 1” collective farm in the Belorechensky District. [30, pp. 18–19], the Cossack Komsomol members Nina Sukhinina, chairwoman of the model Kovalevsky Village Council in the Zverevsky District [31, p. 11], and so on. The costume was intended to indicate the social and professional status of various “notable figures” of the Don and Kuban regions, to demonstrate their democratic spirit, and to show that they were an integral part of the Soviet people.

An equally common tactic was to highlight the high level of social mobility in the USSR, which was undoubtedly one of the indisputable strengths of Soviet society. The press emphasized that in the 1930s, the individual peasant, i. e. the dominant social type in the old countryside was replaced by a diversity of professions, whose representatives were “entirely new people” possessing a higher level of education, a broader outlook, and greater opportunities for development [32, pp. 82, 83]. Shock workers and production leaders were not only supplied according to higher quotas but could also improve their education and advance in their careers. This is illustrated, in particular, by a photograph in the magazine “Kolkhoznitsa”, in which we see “cow milking instructor” N.P. Nikolenko. The caption under the photo states that Nikolenko, a young woman of about 25, was awarded an order for her labor achievements and “began studying at the school for livestock-raising foremen” at the “Artemovets” breeding farm in the Shakhty District of the Azov-Black Sea Region. Nikolenko’s attire reflects her elevated social status: she is pictured at a desk, wearing a jacket, with a fashionable hairstyle [31, p. 6].

In addition, the “notable people” of the USSR participated in All-Union gatherings and forums and were elected to government bodies. For example, 28 Don collective farmers who were “shock workers” attended the All-Union Conference of Leading Livestock Breeders held in February 1936, including M.V. Zelenkov, the herd manager of the “Donskoy Skakun” collective farm in the Tarasovsky District, V.E. Manokhin, the shepherd of the Frunze Collective Farm in the Orlovsky District, V.A. Molchanov, and others [33, p. 271].

The aforementioned All-Union Conference of Leading Livestock Breeders in February 1936 was one of the opening events of the political campaign “for the Soviet Cossacks,” which was launched that same month. According to the wellfounded opinion of A.P. Skorika, this campaign was carried out as one of the avenues of Bolshevik social engineering and “took the form of social construction of the Cossacks” [34, pp. 328–329]. The campaign was not about restoring the Cossacks’ class status, but rather about creating a new, Soviet Cossack community, which could include not only Cossacks proper but also individuals who, in pre-Soviet times, had belonged to the non-Cossack population; that is, the aim was a sort of “Cossackization” of the population of the southern Russian regions [34, p. 324].

During the campaign “for the Soviet Cossacks,” a new image emerged in the press: that of the Cossack collective farmer. Newspapers and magazines began publishing statements by Cossacks asserting that “on the Don land plowed by the revolution, new people have emerged: Soviet Cossacks who no longer look back” [35, p. 1]. Shock workers and Stakhanovites from Cossack collective farms were photographed in traditional attire: a cap, a gymnasterka, and sharovary with stripes. In particular, in one of the photos in the magazine “Kolkhozny Put”, we see I.E. Khromushin, chairman of the “Donskoy Skakun” collective farm in the Tarasovsky District. The collective farm became famous in the USSR during the campaign “for the Soviet Cossacks” as the birthplace of the “Voroshilov Cavalrymen” military-sports movement, whose goal was to train a reserve force for the cavalry units of the Red Army. “Donskoy Skakun” was a Cossack collective farm, as evidenced by Khromushin’s attire: he is pictured wearing a greatcoat and a cap [36, p. 26]. M.A. Danilenko, a combine operator at the Khleborobnenskaya machine-tractor station in the Tselinsky District, posed for the photographer in a jacket but also wore a Cossack cap [37, p. 35].

The “humanization of the hero”, a trend characteristic of the 1930s, did not bypass the periodicals of the Azov-Black Sea region. Of course, the main goal of journalists writing about the labor feats of the “notable people” of the Azov-Black Sea region was to encourage the masses of ordinary workers to follow their example. But since these were real people, albeit ones who had been granted “hero” status, the press wrote about their everyday lives, improvements in their standard of living, personal attachments, and so on. An example of such “humanization” is a photograph in the magazine “Kolkhozny Put”, which shows Litvishko, an order-decorated foreman of the Novo-Popovskaya MTS tractor brigade, in an informal setting: he is riding a bicycle with his two-year-old daughter Raya [37, p. 9]. An issue of the newspaper “Molot” from March 1936 featured a report on Vera Kurkina, a young Cossack woman from the aforementioned “Donskoy Skakun” collective farm. Vera was an active member of the local “Voroshilov Cavalrymen” organization, but, as a young woman, she loved beautiful clothes. According to her, she dreamed of getting a fashionable hat with flowers, which the author of the report wrote about [38].

At times, articles about “notable figures” from the Azov-Black Sea region resemble what we now call “celebrity” features. The articles about Praskovya Ivanovna Kovarjak, the “notable female tractor driver” of the Kanelovskaya Machine-Tractor Station, are particularly telling. She was born into a peasant family in 1913, and because of her age (she was only 27 even by the end of the 1930s), her contemporaries affectionately called her “Pasha Kovardak.” The young, beautiful woman attracted the attention of journalists, who wrote not only about her professional achievements but also, at times, about what might be called her private life. In one issue of the magazine “Kolkhoznitsa” from 1937, there was a photograph showing Pasha Kovardak in a sweater and athletic tights, standing next to a muscular young man on a motorcycle. The caption under the photo informs the reader that Pasha Kovardak, a “decorated worker,” was vacationing in Sochi and, before leaving for Moscow (where she was studying at the Agricultural Academy), visited her home village “to check on her coworkers.” And the young man pictured next to Pasha is Trofim Kostenko, a combine operator at the same Kanelovskaya Machine tractor station [39, p. 9]. Despite the officially neutral caption under the photo, there is clearly an interest in Pasha not as a famous tractor driver, but as a beautiful, interesting woman.

Thus, among the social engineering methods practiced by the Bolsheviks in the 1930s, the concept of the “hero” held a very important place. Heroes, who earned their status through outstanding achievements in labor, science, and social activities, confirmed through their example the theoretical and ideological tenets of Bolshevism regarding the vast opportunities open to the liberated individual within an advanced social system. At the same time, Soviet heroes as model workers and shock workers of the first Five-Year Plan, A.G. Stakhanov and his numerous followers, V.P. Chkalov and other fearless aviators, etc. served as the desired model of the “new man” taking shape in the USSR during the course of socialist transformation.

The Soviet press, as one of the most important mass media outlets, was actively used to promote both the “notable people” themselves and their achievements. The example set by the Soviet “elite” was intended to inspire the broad masses of Soviet citizens to achieve labor feats and, in the long run, to contribute to the formation of a generation of “new people.” Periodicals from the Azov-Black Sea region were also enlisted to fulfill these tasks, regularly publishing a variety of materials about model workers, shock workers, and other “notable people” from the Don, Kuban, and Adygea regions. In the second half of the 1930s, these articles were supplemented by publications about “Soviet Cossacks,” who came to be regarded as one category of “new people” in connection with the large-scale political campaign “for the Soviet Cossacks” that was underway at the time.

An analysis of articles published in newspapers and magazines of the 1930s about the “notable people” of the Azov-Black Sea region reveals the principles that Soviet journalists adhered to when creating the image of a hero. “Notable figures” were expected to come from the working class and demonstrate democratic values and a connection to a specific socio-professional group (collective farmers, machine operators, workers, etc.), which is why they were typically depicted in photographs wearing ordinary work clothes. It was equally important to showcase the high social mobility characteristic of the USSR, where top performers in production could advance their education and skills, secure more prestigious jobs, or join government bodies. The photographs emphasized both the “notable people’s” loyalty to the Soviet regime and the fact that their merits, achievements, improved standard of living, and career advancement were possible only under that regime.

The efforts of the Soviet press including periodicals in the Azov-Black Sea region to create an appealing image of “notable people” and publicize their achievements bore fruit. As models of the “new Soviet man,” these “notable people” became role models for a significant portion of society, as evidenced, in particular, by the widespread development of the Stakhanovite movement. During the grim years of the Great Patriotic War, countless citizens of the USSR, raised on the example of the “new people” of the 1930s, selflessly rose to defend their homeland.